The Modern Age of Informed Consent by Atwell, Barbara L.
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 40 | Issue 2 Article 7
1-1-2006
The Modern Age of Informed Consent
Barbara L. Atwell
Pace University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons, Legislation
Commons, and the Torts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Richmond Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Barbara L. Atwell, The Modern Age of Informed Consent, 40 U. Rich. L. Rev. 591 (2006).
Available at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol40/iss2/7
THE MODERN AGE OF INFORMED CONSENT
Barbara L. Atwell *
Several years ago, Katherine, who at the time was a twenty-
year-old Ivy League undergraduate, responded to an advertise-
ment for egg donors. As a full-time college student, her financial
resources were limited, and the promised $7,500 fee enticed her to
respond.' Katherine consented to the procedure despite the discom-
fort involved and the numerous hormone injections that were re-
quired.2 She successfully donated nine eggs. Katherine subse-
quently graduated from college and is now married with a
successful career. She recently gave birth to her first child. She
has stated repeatedly over the years that she regrets having do-
nated her eggs. Katherine wonders whether there are other chil-
dren who are biologically related to her and to her newborn child.
She is also concerned about the long-term health impact of the
hormone injections that were part of the egg donation procedure.'
* Director, Health Law and Policy Program and Associate Professor of Law, Pace
University School of Law; B.A., 1977, Smith College; J.D., 1983, Columbia University. I
would like to thank Elizabeth Jobson and Ronald Long, Esq., for their generous editorial
assistance. I am also indebted to my research assistants, Briana Fedele and Dr. Gail
Wilder, for their invaluable help.
1. Cf. Jessica Cohen, Grade A: The Market for a Yale Woman's Eggs, ATL. MONTHLY,
Dec. 2002, at 74 (citing an advertisement in the Yale Daily News "offer[ing] $25,000 for an
egg from the right donor"). Typically, egg donors are paid $7,500. Sandra G. Boodman, Us-
ing an Egg Donor and a Gestational Surrogate, Some Gay Men Are Becoming Dads-and
Charting New Legal and Ethical Territory, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2005, at Fl.
2. See Egg Donation, Inc., Donor Info, http://www.eggdonor.com/?section=donor&
page=process (last visited Nov. 16, 2005). "The medical procedures leading up to the actual
aspiration begins with injections of Lupron to suppress your natural menstrual cycle....
[Subsequently], you will begin receiving daily injections of Gonal-f, Fertinex or Follistim to
stimulate your ovaries." Id. When the eggs are sufficiently mature, a single injection of
human chorionic gonadotropin is administered. Id. The final step is for the egg donor to
undergo the actual egg retrieval procedure, which is performed under mild sedation. See
id.; see also Cohen, supra note 1, at 74 ("Donating an egg is neither simple nor painless.").
3. Other forms of hormone manipulation like oral contraceptives and hormone re-
placement therapy have been linked to an increased incidence of breast cancer. See Nat'l
Cancer Inst., U.S. Nat'l Inst. of Health, Oral Contraceptives and Cancer Risk (Nov. 3,
2003), http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/risk/oral-contraceptives (last visited
Nov. 16, 2005); Gina Kolata, Study Is Halted Over Rise Seen in Cancer Risk, N.Y. TIMES,
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I. INTRODUCTION
Among the many innovations for which the twentieth century
will undoubtedly be remembered are its diverse medical ad-
vances. Not only were cures or vaccines found for infectious dis-
eases like polio but other medical advances made possible the ini-
tial diagnosis and treatment of many previously untreatable
conditions. 4 Although advances in medical technology have re-
sulted in a better quality of life, they, like other scientific devel-
opments, have also created challenges. Among these challenges is
the medical and legal issue of informed consent. When the in-
formed consent doctrine was in its infancy, medical care and
medical treatments were far less complex and extensive than
they are today. Now, young adults may seek elective state-of-the-
art medical procedures that result in life-altering changes. As a
result of their youth, these young adults may be consenting for
the first time to these high-tech procedures. Thus, the concern
arises as to the capacity of young adults to understand the full
impact of their decisions.
Advanced medical technology alone might warrant that we re-
visit the informed consent doctrine to determine whether it ade-
quately conforms to today's needs. Compounding the challenge,
though, is another phenomenon that has developed simultane-
ously. The last century has witnessed a social phenomenon in
which fully realized adulthood has been delayed, in large part be-
cause of the increased number of years spent in post-secondary
education. Advanced formal education has led to a delay in mar-
riage, childrearing, and emotional and financial independence. 5
In fact, mental health professionals now recognize a distinct post-
adolescent stage of personal development known as transitional
or emerging adulthood.6 Emerging adults are vulnerable to a so-
July 9, 2002, at Al (stating the effects of hormone replacement therapy when used by
post-menopausal women); cf. Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pit-falls of Unregulated Biomedical Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 603, 614-24 (2003) (discussing
the safety concerns associated with the use of fertility drugs and the dearth of regulation
related to fertility clinics).
4. The development of penicillin and other antibiotics, for example, made possible
the treatment of bacterial infections.
5. See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
6. Emerging adults are generally defined as young adults between the ages of eight-
een and thirty, although other age parameters are occasionally used. See infra note 69 and
accompanying text.
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ciety in which they are treated as though they are fully adult
when, in fact, they are still in the process of becoming adults.7
This essay explores the informed consent ramifications of the
confluence of these two phenomena: developments in medical
technology and emerging adulthood. In particular, it explores
consent to medical treatments by emerging adults that are both
elective and irreversible. In such cases, policy considerations dic-
tate that additional safeguards be implemented to ensure that
the consent given is truly informed.
Part II of this essay provides an overview of the informed con-
sent doctrine and outlines a variety of advancements in elective
medical technology. Part III explores the concept of emerging
adulthood. Part IV suggests that when emerging adults seek
medical treatments that are elective, non-emergent, and irre-
versible, the law should require deliberative consent, a process
that mandates counseling by a patient advocate along with a
waiting period.
II. INFORMED CONSENT AND MODERN MEDICINE
The doctrine of informed consent is well-rooted in American ju-
risprudence.' It is a natural outgrowth of the common law tort of
battery that prohibits intentional unauthorized bodily contact.9
This right to freedom from unwanted contact includes the exami-
nation and treatment by health care professionals as well as oth-
ers. Thus, on a number of occasions, including the landmark case
of Mohr v. Williams,1 ° courts have held that health care providers
7. See discussion infra Part III.
8. CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY: PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND
MEDICAL DECISIONS 6 (1998); see George P. Smith, II, The Vagaries of Informed Consent, 1
IND. HEALTH L. REV. 109, 115-17 (2004).
9. Kate Haas, Who Will Make Room for the Intersexed?, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 41, 61
(2004); Danuta Mendelson, Historical Evolution and Modern Implications of Concepts of
Consent to, and Refusal of Medical Treatment in the Law of Trespass, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 1,
29-35 (1996); Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard
and Experimental Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 364 (2002) ("Informed consent doc-
trine emerged from the intentional tort of battery. In order to avoid the risk of liability for
unlawfully intruding into someone's personal space, a healthcare professional would have
to secure his or her patient's consent before performing a surgical or other therapeutic in-
tervention.').
10. 104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905). In Mohr, the patient consented to surgery on the right
ear, but the surgeon operated on the left ear. See id. at 13. This case was later remanded
2006]
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may be liable for battery." As Judge Cardozo explained in
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital,12 "[elvery human be-
ing of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an
operation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for
which he is liable in damages."1" The logical outgrowth of common
law battery, then, also provides the foundation for the principle of
autonomy in medical decisionmaking. Today, autonomy is the
fundamental principle underlying medical decisionmaking."4
Competent adults exercise that autonomy by deciding whether or
not to consent to medical treatment. 5 This principle has become
such a fundamental part of our legal fabric that individuals are
for a new trial. Mohr v. Williams, 108 N.W. 818, 819 (Minn. 1906).
11. See Duncan v. Scottsdale Med. Imaging, Ltd., 70 P.3d 435, 443 (Ariz. 2003); Chou-
inard v. Marjani, 575 A.2d 238, 242 (Conn. 1990); Rachel L. Alpers, Note, Duncan v.
Scottsdale Medical Imaging, Ltd.; Restoring a Patient's Right to Sue for Battery, 46 ARIZ.
L. REV. 843, 843 (2004). But see Kohoutek v. Hafner, 383 N.W.2d 295, 298 (Minn. 1986)(holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to submit claim of battery
to jury).
12. 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
13. Id. at 93. See generally RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND
THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT, 235-73, 294 (1986) (providing a conceptual analysis of
informed consent); Ken Marcus Gatter, Protecting Patient-Doctor Discourse: Informed Con-
sent and Deliberative Autonomy, 78 OR. L. REV. 941, 945-55 (1999) (tracing the history of
informed consent); Paula Walter, The Doctrine of Informed Consent: To Inform or Not To
Inform?, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 543, 545-49 (1997) (outlining informed consent); Steven
Horowitz, Note, The Doctrine of Informed Consent Applied to Psychotherapy, 72 GEO. L.J.
1637, 1640-41 (1984) (explaining informed consent in the context of psychotherapy).
14. Gatter, supra note 13, at 545-46. For patients who lack decisional capacity, courts
generally adhere as closely as possible to the principle of autonomy by attempting to de-
termine what the patient would choose if he or she were competent. This substituted judg-
ment approach adheres as closely as possible to the principle of autonomy by taking into
account the incompetent's values and religious beliefs along with any prior statements
that reveal what his or her wishes would be. See, e.g., In re Estate of Longeway, 549
N.E.2d 292, 299 (Ill. 1989) (using substituted judgment to determine patient's wishes be-
fore suffering from severe brain damage following a series of strokes.); In re Eichner, 420
N.E.2d 64, 72 (N.Y. 1981) (using pre-illness wishes as consent for patient in a persistent
vegetative state). Another principle in medical decisionmaking is beneficence. It is gener-
ally applied when the primary principle of autonomy is impossible to apply and there is no
rational basis for determining what the patient would choose if he were competent. See,
e.g., In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72-73 (1981) (holding that was impossible to determine
what a mentally retarded man with a mental age of eighteen months would have chosen).
15. See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300-01, 304 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986),
Pub. Health Trust of Dade County v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96, 98 (Fla. 1989). Competency may
be determined by examining (1) the patient's ability to evidence a choice, (2) the "reason-
able" outcome of the choice, (3) whether the choice is based on "rational" reasons, (4) the
patient's ability to understand the choice, and (5) the patient's actual understanding of the
choice. Loren H. Roth, Alen Meisel, & Charles W. Lidz, Tests of Competency to Consent to
Treatment, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279, 280 (1977).
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permitted to refuse medical treatment even when the conse-
quence of that refusal is death.16
Today, the failure to obtain informed consent generally gives
rise to a negligence claim rather than a battery cause of action.
17
Negligence as the basis of a complaint based on lack of informed
consent more closely comports with the reality of medical prac-
tice. Medicine, being as much an art as it is a science," requires
that doctors retain some judgment in determining appropriate
treatments. Failure to exercise proper judgment in treatment de-
cisions is rarely done intentionally. 9 Therefore, medical malprac-
tice claims typically are based on negligence.2 ° Similarly, doctors'
informed consent practices require the exercise of judgment. Dis-
closure may be excused, for example, if in the doctor's judgment
the patient's emotional ability to handle the information is com-
promised. 1 Similarly, disclosure may be excused in an emer-
16. In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, for example, the Supreme
Court inferred that a competent adult 'has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
refusing unwanted medical treatment" including artificial nutrition and hydration. See
497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990); see also In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 669-72 (N.J. 1976)
(holding a father had permission to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from daughter);
Wons, 541 So. 2d at 97-98 (allowing a Jehovah's Witness to refuse life saving blood trans-
fusion). But see Shorter v. Drury, 695 P.2d 116, 620-21 (Wash. 1986) (en banc) (holding
that a hospital's release of a patient based on her refusal as a Jehovah's Witness to accept
blood transfusion did not preclude suit based on negligent performance of operation).
17. See Harrison v. United States, 284 F.3d 293, 298 (1st Cir. 2002) ("To recover under
a theory of informed consent.., a patient must prove that the physician has a duty to dis-
close certain information and that a breach of that duty caused the patient's injury.").
18. See Velazquez v. Portadin, 751 A.2d 102, 107 (N.J. 2000); Barbara L. Atwell,
Mainstreaming Complementary and Alternative Medicine in the Face of Uncertainty, 72
U.M.K.C. L. REV. 593, 604 (2004).
19. In extreme cases, for example, where surgery is performed on the wrong part of
the body, a battery claim may still lie. See, e.g., Chouinard v. Marjani, 575 A.2d 238, 299-
40 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990) (allowing battery claim when patient claimed that she consented
only to surgery on her left breast and surgeon operated on both breasts); cf. Rubino v. De
Fretias, 638 F. Supp. 182, 185-86 (D. Ariz. 1986) (overturning statutes that would have
precluded actions against physicians based on battery).
20. See, e.g., Velazquez, 751 A.2d at 106-07; Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 866 (Miss.
1985); Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 982 (Wash. 1974) (en banc).
21. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("It is recognized
that patients occasionally become so ill or emotionally distraught on disclosure as to...
complicate or hinder the treatment, or perhaps even pose psychological damage to the pa-
tient."); see also Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 558 (Okla. 1979) (holding that withhold-
ing disclosure is allowed if it would alarm an emotionally upset patient). See generally
Margaret A. Somerville, Therapeutic Privilege: Variation on the Theme of Informed Con-
sent, 12 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE, Feb. 1984, at 4, 5; David E. Seidelson, Medical Malprac-
tice Actions Based on Lack of Informed Consent in "Full-Disclosure" Jurisdictions: The En-
igmatic Affirmative Defense, 29 DUQ. L. REV. 39 (1990) (discussing the proposition that
non-disclosure to protect an emotionally frail patient should be eliminated).
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gency,2 2 or in cases where the patient is unconscious." Since the
treating physician retains some flexibility in determining how
much information to disclose, cases based on a failure to obtain
informed consent, like other medical malpractice claims, are
based on negligence.
The goal of informed consent is to obtain "a morally valid con-
sent."24 Thus, each patient must be apprised of the nature of the
treatment, along with any corresponding risks. In addition, the
patient should be given information regarding alternatives to
treatment. 26 Informed consent, then, is designed to protect pa-
tients by ensuring that they have the material information with
which to make an informed choice.
In determining how much disclosure is required, some courts
apply a reasonable physician or professional standard, while oth-
ers apply a reasonable patient standard. Pursuant to the profes-
sional standard, the question is whether the doctor has provided
the same information that another reasonable doctor would pro-
vide under the same or similar circumstances.28 Typically, expert
testimony is required to establish the contours of this standard.
In the landmark case of Canterbury v. Spence,29 however, the
court found that this professional standard failed to adequately
protect the patient.3 ° Instead, the court in Canterbury reasoned
that whether or not adequate information has been given to the
22. See Jackovach v. Yocum, 237 N.W. 444, 451 (Iowa 1931); Miller v. HCA, Inc., 118
S.W.3d 758, 768 (Tex. 2003).
23. King v. Our Lady of the Lake Reg'l Med. Ctr., 623 So. 2d 139, 142 (La. Ct. App.
1993). The patient may also waive the right to material information on his or her own ini-
tiative. See Noah, supra note 9, at 368.
24. Smith, supra note 8, at 112.
25. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780; see also Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Harrison v. United States, 284 F.3d 293, 298 (1st Cir. 2002).
26. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 782.
27. See Noah, supra note 9, at 367 & nn.27-29 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398, 405 (La. 1988); Walls v.
Shreck, 658 N.W.2d 686, 692 (Neb. 2003); Robinson v. Bleicher, 559 N.W.2d 473, 478 (Neb.
1997); Weber v. McCoy, 950 P.2d 548, 552 (Wyo. 1997). New York has codified the profes-
sional standard. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW 2805-d(1) (defining "lack of informed consent"
as "the failure of the person providing the professional treatment or diagnosis to disclose
to the patient such alternatives thereto and the reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits
involved as a reasonable medical, dental or podiatric practitioner under similar circum-
stances would have disclosed, in a manner permitting the patient to make a knowledge-
able evaluation.").
29. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
30. Id. at 783-84.
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patient must be determined from the viewpoint of the reasonable
patient-not the viewpoint of the medical professional." The
court recognized that the "patient's right of self-decision shapes
the boundaries of the duty to reveal."32 A "'risk is . . . material
when a reasonable person, in what the physician knows or should
know to be the patient's position, would be likely to attach signifi-
cance to the risk or cluster of risks in deciding whether or not to
forego the proposed therapy."'33 Today, jurisdictions are split on
whether to use the reasonable patient or the professional stan-
dard. 4
In practice, informed consent is far from perfect, regardless of
whether the reasonable patient standard or the professional
standard is used. First, the process is often inadequate. It may
involve a brief conversation lasting no more than a few minutes
with a health care professional, followed by the signing of consent
forms.35 Second, a 1998 study suggests that physicians sometimes
fail to discuss treatment options that are not covered by insur-
ance. 36 Thus, the patient may be unaware of potentially beneficial
treatments simply because insurance is not available to help pay
for them. Third, the health care providers may be motivated as
much by protecting themselves from litigation as they are by a
desire to provide information to patients. A patient claiming a
lack of informed consent may be met in court with a signed form
outlining the risks and alternatives of treatment, making the in-
formed consent claim difficult to win.37 Finally, the doctor may be
31. Id. at 791.
32. Id. at 786.
33. Id. at 787. Some courts apply a subjective patient standard. See Noah, supra note
9, at 367-68.
34. Noah, supra note 9, at 367. From a bioethical perspective, the reasonable patient
standard is much more compatible with the notion of patient autonomy than the profes-
sional standard. What another doctor would disclose may have little relation to what a
reasonable patient deems material. The reasonable patient standard adheres most closely
to the goal of making sure that consent is truly informed when given.
35. Cf. Jay Katz, Informed Consent-Must It Remain a Fairy Tale?, 10 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POLY 69, 81-84 (1994) (discussing the barriers to doctors and patients mak-
ing joint medical decisions); Jay Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39
U. Pirr. L. REV. 137, 160 (1977) (explaining that the courts' sole focus on disclosure, to the
exclusion of consent, tends to perpetuate physicians' disengaged monologues and to dis-
courage a meaningful dialogue between doctors and patients).
36. Matthew K. Wynia et al., Do Physicians Not Offer Useful Services Because of Cov-
erage Restrictions? HEALTH AFFS. July/Aug. 2003, at 190, 191-94.
37. The key to informed consent is the meaningful receipt of information rather than
the signing of the form. In the hospital setting, some states presume valid consent when
there is written documentation to that effect. The patient must then rebut that presump-
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motivated by his or her own interests, rather than by the inter-
ests of the patient.38 In practice, then, the informed consent doc-
trine, while laudable in theory, is not a panacea.
In addition to the shortcomings discussed above, there are
other challenges associated with the informed consent doctrine.
The doctrine of informed consent dates back to a time when medi-
cal practice was relatively rudimentary. Therefore, due to modern
high-tech medical procedures, certain considerations that were
not relevant when the doctrine was in its infancy are very rele-
vant today. New medical treatments and procedures are being
developed constantly. Thus, some treatments available today
were unimaginable just a few years ago. Not only were medical
treatments far simpler when the doctrine of informed consent de-
veloped, but there were far fewer elective procedures. Patients
went to doctors because they had to, not because they wanted to.
By contrast, modern medicine includes a host of elective proce-
dures, some of which are especially popular with young adults.
Since the requisite age of informed consent is eighteen, 9 emerg-
ing adults are free to consent to any elective medical procedure.
These procedures run the gamut from a wide variety of cosmetic
surgeries, to an assortment of assisted reproduction techniques,
to voluntary participation in human research experiments. A
closer look at treatments popular with emerging adults is insight-
ful.
In 1997, 6,643 cycles of egg donation were reported.40 Egg do-
nors generally must be between the ages of twenty-one and
thirty-two, 41 although some fertility clinics accept donors from a
younger range of ages.42 Thus, virtually all egg donors are emerg-
tion. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.103(4) (West 2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.060
(West 1992).
38. Cf. Deborah Sontag, Abuses Endangered Veterans In Cancer Drug Experiments,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2005 (stating veteran cancer patients were informed that they were
suitable candidates for experimental drug study when, in fact, they were not); see also in-
fra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992); Cal. Med. Ass'n
v. Lackner, 177 Cal. Rptr. 188, 190 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); People v. Enea, 665 P.2d 1026,
1028 (Colo. 1983); In re L.D.F., 820 A.2d 714, 716 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
40. See Owen K. Davis, The Medical Aspects of Egg Donation, RESOLVE; The Na-
tional Infertility Association, at http://www.resolve.org/main/national/treatment/options/
donor/egg.jsp?name=treatment&tag=options (last visited Nov. 16, 2005). A single egg do-
nor can donate multiple eggs per egg donation cycle. See Donor Info, supra note 1.
41. See Boodman, supra note 1.
42. Fertility Futures International, Become an Egg Donor, at http://www.fertilityfu
[Vol. 40:591
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ing adults, and they are often solicited in college or local newspa-
pers.43 Other assisted reproductive technologies ("ART") have also
become quite commonplace in recent years.4 Surrogate mothers,
for example, also frequently fall within the emerging adult age
range, although a wider age range is used for surrogates than for
egg donors. Organizations generally accept surrogates up to the
age of forty. 5 The same is true of sperm donors. 6 Regardless of
the form of ART they employ, fertility clinics are subject to very
little regulation. The combination of a largely unregulated in-
dustry and the involvement of emerging adults, who may be
tempted by financial gain, is troubling.
Cosmetic surgery is also quite popular with emerging adults.
The total number of patients who seek some form of cosmetic sur-
gery is staggering. In 2002, 6.6 million individuals sought some
form of cosmetic surgery. For emerging adults, that number was
approximately 1.6 million.49 The most popular form of cosmetic
surgery for emerging adults was breast augmentation. 50 The most
popular non-surgical procedure was microdermabrasion"
tures.com/donors/index.php (last visited Nov. 16, 2005) (requiring that egg donors be be-
tween the ages of eighteen and twenty-six). Yet other clinics accept donors up to the age of
thirty-five. Davis, supra note 40.
43. Boodman, supra note 1; see Cohen, supra note 1.
44. ART also includes in vitro fertilization, sperm donation, and artificial insemina-
tion, among other things. Noah, supra note 3, at 608-12.
45. See Canberra Fertility Centre, John James Memorial Hospital Ethics Committee
Guidelines for Surrogacy (Jan. 2003), http://www.canberrafertilitycenter.com.au/surrogacy
_JJMemorial.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2005); Reproductive Assistance Inc., Become a Sur-
rogate, http://www.reproductiveassistanceinc.com/surrogates.asp (last visited Nov. 16,
2005).
46. See Fairfax Cryobank Donor Screening, http://www.fairfaxcryobank.com/donor
screen.aspx? menu=48turn=on (last visited Nov. 16, 2005) ("All semen donor applicants
must be 18 to 39 years of age.").
47. See Noah, supra note 3, at 614-16.
48. American Society of Plastic Surgeons, 6.6 Million Americans Get a Nip, Tuck, and
Lift with Cosmetic Plastic Surgery in 2002, Apr. 15, 2003, http://www.plasticsurgery.
org/news.room/press releases/6-6-Million-Americans-Get-A-Nip-Tuck-And-Lift.cfm (last
visited Nov. 16, 2005).
49. Id. The age breakdown by the American Society of Plastic Surgeons includes nine-
teen to thirty-four year olds. See id. Therefore, there is not an identical overlap with the
ages of emerging adults. Eighteen year olds are omitted from this group, while those over
thirty are included. See id.
50. See id.
51. Dermabrasion is the "[m]echanical scraping of the top layers of skin using a high-
speed rotary wheel. Softens sharp edges of surface irregularities, including acne and other
scars and fine wrinkles, especially around the mouth." American Society of Plastic Sur-
geons, Cosmetic Surgery Procedures at a Glance, http://www.plasticsurgery.org/public-
2006]
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Cosmetic surgery is not risk free. In fact, in 2004 a report re-
vealed that two patients died during cosmetic surgery.52 While
death during cosmetic surgery is unusual, the death of these two
patients who were seeking face lifts is a reminder that all surgi-
cal procedures involve risks. Just two years earlier, the surgeon
who performed one of the fatal surgeries "compared cosmetic sur-
gery patients to 'the lady who gets her hair done and her nails
done . . . . People are wanting to do it as a part of personal
grooming.' 53 The effort to appease the public by analogizing sur-
gery to personal grooming is the kind of reassurance that, while
not unanticipated, may lure patients to the operating table, espe-
cially emerging adults who are still transitioning to adulthood.54
One example of patient vulnerability on the part of emerging
adults involves human experimentation.55 Researchers have often
been criticized for "exposing clinical trial participants to serious
risk in the face of adverse data, omitting important information
from informed consent forms, and having financial conflicts of in-
terest." 6 Perhaps the most famous case involving this kind of
lapse was that of Jesse GelsingerY.5  Gelsinger suffered from par-
education/procedures/CosmeticPlasticSurgery.cfm (last visited Nov. 16, 2005). Other forms
of cosmetic surgery include breast enlargement or reduction, liposuction, rhinoplasty (nose
jobs), botox injections, stomach stapling, adominoplasty (tummy tuck), breast lift, browlift,
chemical peel, chin surgery, eyelid surgery, face lifts, facial implants and hair replace-
ment. Id.
52. Alex Kuczynski & Warren St. John, Why Did They Die In Cosmetic Surgery?, N.Y.
TIMES, June 20, 2004, at 1.
53. Id.
54. In fact, even adolescents are undergoing cosmetic surgery in significant numbers.
Laurel Franck, Plastic Surgery Not for Teens, THE BATTALION, http://www.thebatt.
commedia/paper657/news/2003/02/26/Opinion/Plastic.Surgery.Not.For.Teens-14865.shtml
(last visited Nov. 16, 2005) ("While young adults age 18 or younger made up only 4 percent
of all cosmetic surgery patients in 2001, that is still an astonishing 303,103 people."); see
also Shari Roan, For Obese Teens, Surgery of Last Resort; Weight-loss Procedure is Risky,
but Some Doctors Say it Saves Lives, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2004, at Fl (noting the increase
in bariatric surgery, or stomach stapling, among teens despite serious surgical risks). The
death rate from bariatric surgery is 0.5% to 1%. Id.
55. See Noah, supra note 9, at 361. Noah notes that "[h]istorically, sponsors of clinical
trials recruited subjects . . . around college campuses." Id.
56. Josephine Johnston & Francoise Baylis, Gene Therapy: Two Steps Forward, One
Step Back, CANADIAN MED. ASS'N J., http://www.cmaj.ca/cgi/content/full/170/12/1785 (June
8, 2004) (citing Letter from Denis E. Baker, Associate Commissioner for Regulatory Af-
fairs, Food and Drug Administration, Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, to
James Wilson, Institute for Human Gene Therapy, (Feb. 8, 2000), http://www.fda.
gov/foi/nooh/Wilson.htm) (last visited Nov. 16, 2005); see also Kurt Eichenwald & Gina Ko-
lata, Drug Trials Hide Conflicts for Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1999, at Al.
57. See Sally Lehrman, The Gelsinger Story, GENE LETTER, http://www.genesage.com/
professionals/geneletter/05-O1-00/features/gelsingerl.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2005).
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tial ornithine transcarbamylase ("OTC") deficiency, a disorder
that creates dangerously high levels of ammonia in the blood.5"
Just after turning eighteen, Jesse decided to participate in a
clinical trial that he believed would help scientists learn more
about how to cure the disease, though he did not expect to benefit
personally from the treatment. 9 In other words, the procedure
was non-therapeutic for him. Nonetheless, he decided to partici-
pate.6 ° Doctors injected a normal OTC gene attached to a thera-
peutic virus into Jesse's liver; within hours, his system began to
shut down.61 Shortly thereafter, he died. 2
Information later emerged disclosing the fact that prior to
Jesse's death two monkeys died after undergoing a similar gene
therapy procedure. Moreover, there were allegations of earlier
severe adverse reactions that should have resulted in the study
being aborted. 4 Later revelations by the National Institutes of
Health ("NIH") indicated that more than 650 adverse reactions to
gene therapy, including several deaths, had occurred throughout
the country.65 Sometimes, even the doctors themselves are not
aware of the risks associated with certain medical treatments. In
the research arena, for example, it has been reported that it is
difficult for anyone, whether a member of the general public or a
skilled scientist, to learn details about the problems cropping up in
gene therapy studies. Even a new National Institutes of Health
("NIH") database on clinical trials ... will include no information
about adverse reactions to gene therapy treatments. Further, finan-
cial alliances and conflicts-of-interest will not be included.
66
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Gene Therapy Business: The Tragic Case of Jesse Gelsinger, NEWS WEEKLY, Aug.
12, 2000, www.newsweekly.com.au/articles/2000aug12_bio.html (last visited Nov. 16,
2005).
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. Id. The article goes on to state:
We know that informed consent doesn't work," says Arthur Caplan, who di-
rects a large bioethics program at University of Pennsylvania .... Caplan
says the privatisation [sic] of science, combined with patients' ardent desire
for a cure, conspire to prevent meaningful protections for participants in all
kinds of studies. Trade secrets, financial conflicts of interest and overloaded
review committees obstruct informed consent by keeping news about ongoing
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Given the realities of modern medicine and the shortcomings of
informed consent, it may be advisable to completely revamp the
doctrine of informed consent. For example, different categories of
informed consent could be created for different kinds of medical
treatments.67 One process could apply in emergency situations,
while another procedure might work best with routine, non-
emergency treatments. Perhaps the law should be most demand-
ing of informed consent with elective procedures since the patient
could elect to forego treatment. The shortcomings of an imperfect
system of informed consent are compounded when vulnerable,
young, emerging adults consent to treatments that are elective
and irreversible.6" Such cases are the focus of the remainder of
this discussion.
III. EMERGING ADULTHOOD
A recent body of social science literature has identified a sepa-
rate phase of personal development that takes place approxi-
mately between the ages of eighteen and thirty69 known as
emerging adulthood.7 ° Surveys suggest that individuals in this
studies beyond the reach of patients and researchers alike.
Id.
67. Cf Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 906 (1994)
(arguing that informed consent must be contextualized).
68. For medically necessary treatments, emerging adults would continue to be treated
as other competent adults. See In re Quackenbush, 383 A.2d 785 (N.J. 1978) (explaining
that patient may have capacity for some purposes but not others). Traditional informed
consent procedures may continue to be used for medically necessary procedures, while the
enhanced, deliberative consent procedures described below would be implemented for elec-
tive and irreversible procedures.
69. E.g., The Network on Transition to Adulthood, Between Adolescence and Adult-
hood: Expectations About the Timing of Adulthood, http://www.transad.pop.upenn.edu/
news/between.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2005) (studying young adults between the ages of
eighteen and thirty) [hereinafter Between Adolescence]; Election 2004 and Emerging
Adults (18-30 year olds), http://www.hs.ttu.edu/hdfs3390/fal104project.htm (last visited
Nov. 16, 2005) (defining emerging adults as eighteen to thirty year olds). Others have used
similar, though not identical age ranges. Cf. Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood:
A Theory of Development From the Late Teens Through the Twenties, 35 AM. PSYCHOL.
469, 469 (2000) (stating that the age of emerging adults extends from "the late teens
through the twenties, with a focus on ages 18-25"); Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Conceptions of
the Transition to Adulthood Among Emerging Adults in American Ethnic Groups, NEW
DIRECTIONS FOR CHILD AND ADOLESCENT DEV., Summer 2003 at 63, 64 (defining emerging
adults as aged eighteen to twenty-nine); David J. Hanson et al., Rethinking Alcohol Use by
the Emerging Adult, at http://www2.potsdam.edu/alcoholinfo/YouthIssues/1046347764.
html (last visited Nov. 16, 2005) (discussing the drinking habits of college-aged adults).
70. The transition between adolescence and adulthood has been given a variety of la-
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age group consider themselves neither adolescents nor fully
adult.7' Social scientists agree that this interval is a time of tran-
sition between the two. Emerging adults are engaged in a process
of "change and exploration," and are still defining their identi-
ties."
There are a number of characteristics, both internal and exter-
nal, associated with emerging adults. Internal "characteristics
that matter most to emerging adults .. .are . . .individualistic
qualities of character."7s Emerging adults, for example, find them-
selves exploring what their own values and beliefs are as distin-
guished from those that were imposed upon them by their par-
ents.74 They consider full adulthood to be associated with those
who have developed a concrete awareness of their values and be-
liefs.75 In addition, the ability to make independent decisions,
while limited in emerging adults, is a characteristic that is often
associated with full adulthood.76 For example, emerging adults
who are in college and still dependent on their parents have a
more limited range of independent decisionmaking than their
counterparts who are full-time participants in the work force.
Another internal characteristic associated with emerging
adults is the emerging ability to accept responsibility for one's
bels, including: "early adulthood," Between Adolescence, supra note 69; "emerging adult-
hood," A Theory of Development, supra note 69, at 469; and "adultescence," Annie Nakao,
They Can (And Do) Go Home Again: Empty Nest Syndrome? Parents of "Boomerang" Chil-
dren Should Be So Lucky, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., May 30, 2004, at Fl. Yet another re-
search psychologist calls these young adults "thresholders" because they are on the
threshold of adulthood. TERRI APTER, MYTH OF MATURITY: WHAT TEENAGERS NEED FROM
PARENTS TO BECOME ADULTS 24 (2001). Finally, this period of transition between adoles-
cence and adulthood has been called the "quarterlife crisis." ALEXANDRA ROBBINS & ABBY
WILNER, QUARTERLIFE CRISIS 5 (2001).
71. E.g., A Theory of Development, supra note 69, at 471-72. Arnett argues that the
period between ages eighteen and twenty-five "is neither adolescence nor young adulthood
but is theoretically and empirically distinct from them both." Id. at 469.
72. Id. at 471.
Emerging adulthood is a time of life when many different directions remain
possible, when little about the future has been decided for certain, when the
scope of independent exploration of life's possibilities is greater for most peo-
ple than it will be at any other period of the life course.
Id. at 469.
73. A Theory of Development, supra note 69, at 472-73 (citation omitted) (emphasis in
original).
74. See Ethnic Groups, supra note 69, at 70.
75. See id.
76. A Theory of Development, supra note 69, at 472-73 (citations omitted).
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self.77 This can include being considerate of others.78 It also in-
cludes developing the ability to minimize risk-taking behavior.7 9
Risk-taking behavior related to drinking, drugs, and sexuality, for
example, can be particularly challenging for the emerging adult. 8o
Emerging adults identify these internal factors, rather than ex-
ternal societal markers, as the key to adulthood."1
Nonetheless, a second set of external factors further describes
emerging adults. For example, more individuals in this age range
than ever before are continuing their education. 2 Consequently,
they are delaying marriage, entering into the workforce, parent-
ing, and other behaviors typically associated with adulthood.8
Emerging adults are often still partially dependent on their par-
ents, financially and emotionally.84
Aside from some of the foregoing characteristics of emerging
adults, both internal and external, emerging adults can be diffi-
cult to define. For example, data suggests that most adolescents
[age twelve to seventeen] still live at home with one or both par-
ents.88 It also indicates that by the age of thirty, most people live
independently outside their parents' home and are employed or
participating in the work force. 6 Between the ages of eighteen
and thirty, however, during this stage of emerging adulthood, the
77. Id.
78. See Ethnic Groups, supra note 69, at 63.
79. See id.
80. See infra notes 89-98 and accompanying text.
81. See Ethnic Groups, supra note 69, at 63.
82. See A Theory of Development, supra note 69, at 471 ("The proportion of American
emerging adult who enter higher education in the year following high school is at its high-
est level ever, over 60%.").
83. Only 32% of twenty-five to twenty-nine year olds, however, have completed four
years of college. Id. Instead, emerging adults are engaged in a wide range of exploratory
behavior including education, work, and exploring romantic partners. It has been sug-
gested that other cultures with different ideas of adulthood may not experience the phe-
nomenon of emerging adults. See Larry J. Nelson, Rites of Passage in Emerging Adult-
hood: Perspectives of Young Mormons, in EXPLORING CULTURAL CONCEPTIONS OF THE
TRANSITION TO ADULTHOOD 33, 33 (Jeffrey Jensen Arnett & Nancy L. Galambos eds.,
2003).
84. Cf. Jennifer Medino, Stay Local, or Go South? It's the Geography, Cupid, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2005, at 14WC ("[Y]oung adults living at home now make up more than 30
percent of the 22 to 3 1-year-olds in the New York-North New Jersey area. Nationally, that
figure is about 14 percent."); Lynda Richardson, Persuading Youth to Think Ahead (Way
Ahead), N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2005, at B4 ("Almost 6 out of 10 college graduates are moving
home to live with parents after graduating.").
85. A Theory of Development, supra note 69, at 471.
86. See id.
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demographics are quite varied."7 It may be difficult, then, to find
a way to balance independence, on one hand, with the need for
clear rules and guidance, on the other. Acknowledging this chal-
lenge, the Skidmore College website queries: "What is the right
balance between nurturing and challenge, rights and responsi-
bilities, individualism and community? . . .Respect for our stu-
dents' emerging adulthood means that ... we will on occasion in-
tervene with other offices and programs on the student's behalf.
1, 88
Challenges associated with alcohol consumption demonstrate
the difficulty of striking the right balance between independence
and rule-setting with emerging adults. As noted above, alcohol
abuse, though not limited to emerging adults, is nonetheless a
challenge with this age group. Legal recognition of the drinking
problem prompted every state to raise its legal drinking age from
eighteen to twenty-one.89 Therefore, a segment of younger emerg-
ing adults cannot legally drink at all.9" As soon as this group
turns twenty-one, though, they can legally drink without supervi-
sion. Under-age drinking is relatively common and has led com-
mentators to suggest that raising the drinking age to twenty-one
has been largely ineffective.9 They suggest that the ability to
drink, like the ability to drive in many states, be phased in so
that emerging adults recognize drinking as an activity that can
be a normal part of adult social life rather than something associ-
ated with binge drinking and getting drunk:92
Having a bird's eye view of collegiate drinking as both keen observ-
ers of drinking and its outcomes and long-term members of campus
life, we would like to suggest an alternative to zero-tolerance: a sys-
87. See id. ("IThe years of emerging adulthood are characterized by a high degree of
demographic diversity and instability.. ").
88. Dean of Student Affairs, Skidmore College, Students as Emerging Adults,
www.skidmore.edu/administration/dean-students/emerging-adults.html (last visited Nov.
16, 2005).
89. See Ken Sternberg, Alcohol Consumer Must Be 21 Years Old in All States; Con-
cerns Remain About Drunk Driving, 260 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2479, 2479 (1988). Access to
federal funding was also a factor. A portion of federal highway funding can be withheld if
a state reduces the drinking age below twenty-one. See 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2000); South Da-
kota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987) (upholding the constitutionality of 23 U.S.C. § 158).
90. Cf. Margaret Raymond, Penumbral Crimes, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1395, 1412-15
(2002) (arguing that underage drinking laws are marred by a high degree of noncompli-
ance and lack of enforcement).
91. See, e.g., Hanson et al., supra note 69.
92. See id.
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tern of gradual access to alcoholic beverages by consumption-inclined
19- and 20-year-olds. Why not teach responsible drinking behavior
under mature supervision rather than leave these young adults to
experiment on their own?9
Thus, the authors suggest that emerging adults under the age
of twenty-one be permitted to obtain provisional drinking li-
censes 94
Although the legal drinking age is twenty-one in every state,
eighteen is the age of majority for most activities. Eighteen-year-
olds can consent to many life-altering decisions, such as joining
the military and getting married. 95 Eighteen-year-olds can also
vote and enter into contracts.96 Since society considers eighteen to
be the age of majority for most activities, 97 one might argue that
eighteen-year-olds should also be able to give informed consent to
medical treatments without further inquiry. On the other hand,
by raising the legal drinking age to twenty-one, every state has
set limits around an activity that is also not medically necessary
and that has potentially harmful repercussions. 9 Thus, there is
universal legal recognition that prior to reaching the age of
twenty-one, some activities should be restricted. 99 The next sec-
tion explores the parameters that would best serve emerging
adults who are considering medical treatments that are neither
medically necessary nor reversible.
93. Id. The authors go on to note that '[tihe modern age-based prohibition seems to be
working no better than the 1920s version; while a smaller percentage of young adults are
now drinking, a sizable minority is drinking recklessly." Id.
94. Id. Certain restrictions would apply to provisional licenses. Id. For example,
drinking after a certain hour may be prohibited. Id. In addition, formal instructions on
responsible drinking would be required. Id.
95. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Youthful Indiscretions: Culture, Class, Status, and
the Passage to Adulthood, 51 DEPAuL L. REV. 743, 758 (2002).
96. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 (guaranteeing eighteen-year-olds the right to
vote).
97. Woodhouse, supra note 95, at 758. The author notes the troubling exception in the
criminal context of treating children like adults, particularly poor children of color. Id. at
757 (citing Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment,
Treatment and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L. REv. 821, 884 (1988)); see also supra
note 39 and accompanying text (stating that individuals over the age of eighteen can le-
gally consent to elective medical procedures).
98. See supra note 89-97 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text. Those who have studied emerging
adults would arguably suggest that particular care must be paid to individuals up to the
age of thirty. See A Theory of Development, supra note 69, at 473-74 (suggesting that peo-
ple between ages eighteen and twenty-five are still struggling with evolving self-
conceptions of love, work, and world views).
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IV. DELIBERATIVE CONSENT
We live in a society in which we have a confluence of two dis-
tinct phenomena: advanced medical technology that now offers
not only medically necessary treatments, but a whole host of elec-
tive ones, and a distinct stage of personal development known as
emerging adulthood. The informed consent implications need to
be explored.
If we begin by reviewing the goals of informed consent and the
reasons why the doctrine was developed, it was clearly to protect
autonomy and meaningful choice. By being fully informed, pa-
tients can make empowered and informed decisions. Informed
consent was legally intended to partner the person with informa-
tion so that his or her assent was based on full disclosure. Pa-
tients would then be allowed to make educated choices and not be
unduly persuaded to consent to medical treatments without ade-
quate deliberation. 0
The goals, then, behind the informed consent doctrine are
laudable. Yet abuses may occur when material information is
withheld. Moreover, third parties can manipulate the system
when, for their own benefit, they withhold important facts from
patients who believe they are getting complete information.0 1 If
we revisit the example set forth at the outset of this piece, we can
see the challenges faced by emerging adults like Katherine. When
Katherine consented to the egg donation, she had limited finan-
cial resources and had just discovered that she could earn $7,500
for donating her eggs. This procedure was not medically neces-
sary for her and was irreversible. Moreover, the procedure itself
was not simple. It involved hormone injections and surgery to re-
trieve the eggs.10 2 Should her consent to the procedure be valid?
Clearly, informed consent concerns are heightened in a case
like this, where there is a financial inducement. However, even if
Katherine consented to cosmetic surgery, a medical procedure
with no financial gain, issues would remain about her maturity
100. See supra notes 8-38 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 55-67 and accompanying text regarding human experimentation.
This manipulation of the system may also occur in the case of infertility clinics that need
donors and surrogates to survive, particularly since they are poorly regulated. See supra
note 47 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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as an emerging adult, particularly given current concerns about
whether the standard informed consent process adequately serves
its original mission. 10 3 We can examine the validity of the in-
formed consent under both the standard informed consent para-
digm, as it is typically implemented today, and a proposed delib-
erative consent process.
Standard informed consent in today's medical decisionmaking
generally involves a brief discussion with the health care provider
of the risks and alternatives of the proposed treatment or proce-
dure, followed by the immediate signing of consent forms. A key
concern of the health care provider is getting the form signed
rather than confirming that the patient understands the material
facts. As long as the informed consent form is signed, the doctor
can defend against a claim that the patient lacked informed con-
sent. In Katherine's case, then, the doctors would presumably ac-
knowledge that there are minor risks associated with hormone in-jections and sedation, but would be likely to reassure Katherine
of the relative safety of the procedure. This brief explanation
would be followed by the signing of the consent form.
Deliberative consent would require additional procedural safe-
guards to ensure that the emerging adult's decision has been
properly considered. The first procedural safeguard would require
the involvement of a patient advocate.' 4 The patient advocate
and the emerging adult would be required to have a conversation
about the specific medical procedure being considered. That con-
versation should be at least forty-five to fifty minutes in duration,
and the emerging adult should explicitly be given the opportunity
to ask questions about the treatment. Moreover, the conversation
needs to explore the emerging adult's motivation for undergoing
the procedure and to examine whether he or she has considered
the long-term ramifications thereof.0 . Second, following the con-
103. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
104. There are varying definitions of patient advocates. National Patient Safety Foun-
dation, The Role of the Patient Advocate: A Consumer Fact Sheet www.npsf.org/downloadl
PatientAdvocate.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2005). Patient advocacy is a relatively new field;
see Sarah Lawrence College, Health Advocacy Program of Study, http://www.slc.edu/grad-
healthadvocacy.php (describing masters program in health advocacy at Sarah Lawrence
College.) (last visited Nov. 16, 2005).
105. There is no indication that this is effectively taking place right now. While repu-
table offices may provide some mechanism for assessing the competency of the emerging
adult, it often appears to be for the purpose of protecting someone other than the emerging
adult. At least one reporter concedes that "[elthicists worry that the practice of buying
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versation with the patient advocate, the emerging adult must
wait an additional forty-eight hours before final consent is given.
This process would help ensure that the ultimate decision has
been properly considered. °6
Deliberative consent, then, would include all the components of
informed consent as it is currently structured and would add new
procedural safeguards. The key to determining whether a patient
gave deliberative consent would not be whether the last step in
the process-the signing of the consent form-was completed. In-
stead, the focus would be on the process leading up to the signing
of the form. 7 In cases like Katherine's, a patient advocate would
be able to ask questions that specifically address issues like how
she thinks she might feel about the procedure in five to ten years,
or how she will feel after having children of her own. Alterna-
tively, she might simply ask what Katherine thinks may be the
long-term implications of her decision. Simply asking the ques-
tion may raise Katherine's awareness of nuances that she other-
wise might not have considered. Emerging adults like Katherine
have more limited life experience, based both on their youth and
on limited exposure outside the educational setting. Their aware-
ness of other options for achieving their goals may therefore be
restricted. Katherine, for example, may have a host of other op-
tions for obtaining $7,500. The patient advocate should ask, for
example, whether Katherine has considered other sources that
might be available to help her financially.08 Thus, the focus of de-
liberative consent will be on full discussion and disclosure, includ-
eggs and renting a uterus raises questions about informed consent." Boodman, supra note
1, at Fl. The author also notes that Creative Family Connections, a law firm based in
suburban Washington, D.C., requires its donors and surrogates to "undergo medical and
psychological evaluation." Id. It is not clear, though, that this evaluation is for the benefit
of the donor or surrogate. It is, perhaps, to protect the law firm from future claims that
consent was not fully informed.
106. While the legal age of consent for these medical procedures, like the legal drinking
age, could be raised to twenty-one, there are too many other life altering decisions that can
be made at the age of eighteen to justify a special exception for these procedures. More-
over, that would do nothing to address the special concerns of emerging adults between
the ages of twenty-one and thirty.
107. See CHARLES W. WIDE, INFORMED CONSENT: A STUDY OF DECISIONMAKING IN
PSYCHIATRY 318, 326 (1985) (noting that informed consent forms are too complex, are of-
ten not read, and are presented too late in the decisionmaking process).
108. One might expect that a reputable fertility clinic would do this as a matter of
course. Fertility clinics, however, are subject to little state regulation and presumably run
the gamut in terms of professionalism. See Noah, supra note 3, at 614-16.
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ing interaction with a patient advocate who has no personal stake
in the patient's decision.'0 9
A two-pronged test can be used to determine when these
heightened informed consent procedures should be implemented.
First, the procedure must be one that is not medically necessary
for the patient. Second, the procedure must be difficult or impos-
sible to reverse. Procedures that might satisfy this two-pronged
approach include egg donation, as mentioned above. It would also
include sperm donation, surrogacy, breast implants, genetic tests,
sterilization, many forms of cosmetic surgery, and perhaps even
tattoos. Experimental treatments, particularly those that are
non-therapeutic for the participant, would also be included. Live
kidney and liver donations would be another, as would bone mar-
row donations. 10
Some may suggest that since eighteen-year-olds can vote,
marry, and join the armed services, among other things, they
should also be free to consent to medical treatments without en-
hanced procedural protections. They may further argue that any
modification of the informed consent process would be too pater-
nalistic. Given the shortcomings of informed consent in its cur-
rent incarnation, the better policy is to provide greater protection
to this vulnerable population of emerging adults. A deliberative
consent approach arguably would be ideal in many instances of
medical decisionmaking, not just those involving emerging
adults. Anyone undergoing medical treatments should be well-
educated about the process and its risks and alternatives. In ad-
dition, a period of deliberation would be welcome. Other contexts
for deliberative consent can be explored at another time. For now,
an appropriate place to start, and a context in which deliberative
109. Financially, the patient advocate must remain in a position of neutrality. Thus,
either this person must be paid a flat salary or another mechanism that will promote im-
partiality must be implemented.
110. This is not intended to be an exhaustive list. The decision to have an abortion is
explicitly excluded from this list. First, an abortion may be medically necessary and emer-
gent in some situations. Second, acting in a timely fashion can be critical. Third, the right
to abort is founded on well-recognized constitutional principles, the parameters of which
have been explored intermittently for more than three decades by the Supreme Court of
the United States. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The examples listed in
the text have not been subjected to that kind of scrutiny. Finally, abortion is an emotion-
ally charged, unique issue in American society as well as in American jurisprudence and
should be considered separately.
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consent should be required, is that involving emerging adults
considering elective and irreversible medical treatments.111
V. CONCLUSION
In this modern age of informed consent, an eighteen-year-old
can undergo significant medical procedures that, while risky, are
neither medically necessary nor reversible. Thousands of young
emerging adults undergo elective, yet irreversible medical treat-
ments each year. Given the continuing personal development of
emerging adults and the failure of the traditional informed con-
sent paradigm to fulfill its goals of patient protection, a new, de-
liberative consent paradigm should be implemented. Deliberative
consent would require counseling by a patient advocate and a
waiting period for emerging adults undergoing certain elective
medical procedures. This would better fulfill the goals behind the
informed consent doctrine of educating patients and obtaining
thoughtfully provided consent.
111. Cf. Schuck, supra note 67, at 906 (arguing that informed consent should be con-
textualized to the particular setting in which it is given).
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